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The conflict between the C'wuti1m governmeut und the SerhiatJ minority in 
the Ul'fPJ\ zones in C"roatiu wu deep and 1rrt'COnalable. The Croatian gmcm-
mcnt tried. a1 "11) pncc. to brin~ rbc UNPA mne<~ under the awhntit) u{ Za-
greb "'hile tbc Serbian sec:rssiumsc; wanted to ~oeparate the UNPA 1.0nes frnm 
C"m~tiu and bring it under the lluthot ity of Belgrade anc.l Serbia. The oonllict 
between C"ronts and the ethnic St:rbs In Crorttin ~-urrcsponds tn the t'Onccpt of 
a deeply tooted conflict as described hy John W. Durton and Uonald L Hor-
owitz. 
The nulbor anal)~ the prua:ss o f the ncgottation.~ betv.ccn the Cm.·uian 
authorities and the l.xal Serbs fmm the vNPA ronc Eu!.t in the fall or 1995. 
The: ethnic ~rb:. agreed to a cumpromise witl1 the Croatian government after 
they had found thc:m.,elv~ in a stalcm:ne. tsy this term William Zartman un-
der..llillcls when one t:tl10ic Aroup SGel> no other way uu~ since all '""' military 
and politicrtl rnU\'CS have ht-en blocked for il. I be author thinks this i,. the 
main reawn ~hy the local Serbs in ca:.tem Sln-oni:~ agn:c:d tO a dialogue. ac-
<--epted Lhe comp~c and 'igncd tbc ErduJ AcumJ on 12 Fehrulll)' 1995. 
The contliet between the central government rn Croatia and the local 
Serbian secessionil>l"' in Eastern Slavonia (the name cm·ers Baranja and 
Western Sirntium as well) entered a new stage of development following 
the jolting defeat of St.:rbian rebels in Western Slavonja in May and cen-
tral Crm1tia in August of 1995. ln 19~0 and 1991, the Serbian sece. sion-
il>Ls occupied 22.7% of Cnwtian territory. E-astern Shwonia accounted for 
4.6% of lhat total (Crk:venCic, Kl~.:menC:ic, 1993, p. 11>). They we re aitled 
by the armed Serhs from Bosnia and Herzegovina and the rump Yugo-
slavia (known as chetniks) and the federal Yugosh1v Army unit . The war 
against Croatia wal. \\'Itged by sections of the Serbian minority in Croatia, 
the interventionist forces fmm Uosnia, Serbia and Montenegro with the 
aim o f aunexing all tin: occupied te rritories and uniting thern with Serbia. 
Balkanologists such as lvo S anae and Charles Jelavich have branded o;uch 
politics Serbiun n:nionalil>m whose aim is to create Greater Serbia 
(Jelavicb, 1990). 
The joint war effort of tbe Serbs from Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and 
Montenegro with lhe support nf the Federal Yugoslav Anny was a dirty 
war conqut:.')4 which confnrms to Carolyn ordstrom's definition o f -.uch 
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wars (Nordstrom, 1991, 1992). She says that terror-utilizing wars are dirty 
because the conquerors and the attackers do not go for the political or 
military victory; their <1im is to put down every possible, even presumptive 
resistance in order to pacify, even enervate the population (see Suarez-
Orosco, 1987). "A dirty war", says Non.lstrom ''t.lues not strive solely at 
the political and physical destruction of the enemy, but aims at eliminat-
ing the ve1y foundations of the enemy culture, the structure of their 
thinking anJ evcrylhing that Jefines and identifies the popnlation" 
(Nordstrom, 1992, p. 28). 
1 n 1991 a_nu 1992 the joint Serhian occupying forces destrnycJ re. .. ;iden-
tial, industrial, cultural and religious facilities which gave rise to the term 
"scorched land" as a subtype of dirty war. Another form of dirty war and 
"scorched land" is the exhaustive ethnic cleansing of the occnpied territory 
from non-Serbian population. The most obvious illustration of the dirty 
war waged by the jou1t Serbian forces anJ the FcJeral Army in E<tloil.cm 
Slavonia is the total destruction of the town of Vukovar. A month ago, 
the lntemational Criminal Tribunal in D en Haag indicted three high-
mnking officers of the former Yugoslav Federal Army for war crimes and 
crimes against humanity committed in Vukovar in 1991. 
Inter.mtlional intervention - UNPA sectors and 
UNPROPOR 
The EU and UN mediation brought about a cease-fire between the 
Croatian government and the Yugoslav Federal /\rmy which was signed in 
Sarajevo on 2 Januaty 1992. The UN Security Council then passed the 
Resolution 740 of 7 February, which envisaged four sectors of UN pro-
tected areas (UNP/\) on 26. 1% (or one fourth) of Croatian territory, oc-
cupied by the joinl Serbian military forces (Resolution 740, 1992). Security 
ConnciJ passed another resolution, number 743 of 21 Februmy 1992, whlch 
envisaged sending UN peacekeeping forces into Croatia (the so o1Ued 
UNPROFOR) with the task of maintaining peace and mediating in the 
resolution of local conflicts. 
/\ccording to the 1991 census, Croati;t h<td 4,760,000 inhabitants. The 
ethnic Serhs' share amounted to 580,762 or 12.2% . According to the same 
census, before the war there were 546,000 people (273,000 Serbs or 
46.6%) in the UNPA zones (CrkvenciC, Klernencic, 1993). According to 
the Jala gathered by UNHCR and tbe Croatian Bureau for refugees and 
displaced people, out of 275,000 non-Serbs in the UNPA zones, 247,000 
were banished to the territnry under the Croatian authority (UNHCR, 
1993). Immediately upon the establishment of the UNPA zones in 1992, 
the Croatian government wanted to integratt: the occupied territodes (the 
UNP/\ zones) and establish the authority of the central Croatian govem-
menl, while Lhe local Serhs from the UNPA and those from the so called 
Republic of Serbian Krajim• wanted to legalize secession am.l unite with 
the rump Yugoslavia. The international Co11fercm:c on the Former Yugo-
slavia tried its hand at fash inning peace and declared that internationally 
recognized bnn.lcr-. uf the Republic of Croatia or any other European 
state cannot be changed by force; they all\n dcd<1red that Serbs in Croatia 
have the right to cuhurul und territorial autonomy and to the special 
status uf II out of 13 communes where Serb!. make :1bsolute majoriry. 
Local Serbian secessionists from the U PA zones did not consenr to take 
part in any talk-; hno;ed on this proposal; instead they tlcmanded the le-
gali7J1Iion of the secession and advocatet.l the change of borders by force. 
The Z-4 Group (the four amh»ssadors of America, Russia, Great Rritain, 
anti France together with the Conference on 1 he Former Yugoslavia) 
came up with "Draft Agrc~.:ment on the Krajina, Slavonia, Southern 
Baranja and Western Sirmium" on 1M January .1995 which offered to the 
local Serbs considerable political, territorial and monetary autonomy (Draft 
Agreement, 1995). The local Serhmn representatives in Knin, the centre of 
the so called Kmjina, did not want to meet with Lh~ Z-4 representatives 
nor accept the proposed '·Draft Agreement''. 
ln two police-military opcr<~tions, the Croarian forces libc;ra ted and in-
tegrated tlm:e UNPA zones: West, North allll South. Only the UNPA 
t.one East (Eastern SJavonia, Baranja e~od Western Si.nnium) remained 
outside the Croatian authority. According to the 199 1 census the popula-
tion uf thi-; region totaled 188.184 people; there were 57,236 Serb or 
30.4% (1991 Census, 1992). 
The secession i~t policy of ethnic Serbs in Croa ria 
ln early I 990s, 1 he time of the collapse of communist systems in Cen-
tral and Eastern L.£urope, the time of the breakup of Warsaw Pat.:l , the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there occurred a political rirft in the ranks 
of Serbian ethnic cummunity in Croatia. Urban Serbs, mostly rallied round 
the Social-Democratic party of ex-communists, reconciled themselves to the 
idea that communism had collapsed and YugoJavia broke up. The rest of 
the Serbian population, mostly from rural centres of central and ea'\tcrn 
C'.roaria, did not acquiesce in nor put up with the demi:-e of socialism, 
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. They claimed that, on the contrary, 
Yugoslavia did not break up, but Llwt Slovenia, Croatia and other Yugo-
slav republics seceded. Tlwir politics at the time was part nnd parcel of 
Serbian nationalism and populism, epitomi7.ed by Serbian president 
Miloscvic, who strove by hook or hy crook to preserve Yugo£lavia ~lS a 
unitary and strong fedecalion under Belgrade's control. 
The rel pon. c to Milosevic's politics and the Serbian ~ationalist popu-
lism wa the e. tahli bment of new democratic parties m the republics 
where Milo£evic had failed to gain c.:untTOI; these parties then directct.l 
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their activitie against the fellt.;ml government in Belgrade and channeled 
Lheir t!ffort-. towards gaining national independence. Serbian minority in 
Croatia and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, allie • of Milo5eviC's pan-
Setbiau populi.'>t movement, turned against the central governments in Za-
grch Hnd Sarajevo and organized a militarist secessionist mnvcmcnt. It W<l 
led by Serbian Democratic Party from Knin (see Javorovic, 1995, and the 
contrary opi11inn hy B. Jak.~ic, Stojaoovic, 1994). i\t the height of their 
military conquests, the !:>erbian secessionists together with the joint Serbian 
interventionists occupiell a lmost 27% nf Croatian territory and over 70% 
of 1 he territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The rift betw~en Croatian authmitic." <tnd the Serbian minority in the 
UNPA zone.' wa1o. deep and irreconcilable. The Croatian authorities tried, 
a t any cost. to integrate the UNPA zones while the Serbian secessionists 
wanted to cut off the UNPA zones from Croatia and bring them under 
Belgrade's authority. The conflict between Croats anc.J the e thnic Serbs in 
Croatia conforms to John W. Burtun·., LXmcept of a deeply rooted conflict 
(Burton, 1987) ur tu the notion of high conllicts analyzed by Donaltl T . 
Horuwil7 (Ho rowitz. 1989). The emergence of deep tl~trust and the sense 
of imperilment paved the way for the homogenization of the pan-Serbtan 
nntionali<>t movement in late 1980s in the former Yugoslavia. Thw. a fmc-
linn of the Serbian minority u ed violence in their secessionist politics, 
. imilar to the manner in whidl the Serbian minorities in Montenegro, 
Voivodimt uml Kosovo did away with their respectivt: governments. 1n 
Croatia, the purpost: of the use of violence w<ts to destroy, burn and 
banish the entire non-Serbia11 population. while in Bosnia and Herzt:guvina 
thcir aim wa · total genocide and annihilation of Bosnian Muslims 
(1/e/sinki Watch R eport, 1992, 1993). 
ln the lru t twenty odd years, the wars between ethnic L'Ommunities in 
the "tates like Sri Lanka. Cyprus. Nsam in India, Pakistan, Nigeria, and 
alike, show that the dept11 ant! the implacability of these ethnic connidl> 
a re roo ted in the cxclru ive and strong will to gaiJl :.ovcrcignty a nd the 
contrul over the lands which are considered the homeland of the auto-
chthonous population. Horowiu :vt)'l- that ethnic communities and minori-
ties in various l.lalt!S demonstrate extreme propinquity to their mother na-
tion and a strong emotiooaJ and collective distance from the people the. 
live with in the . am~ state (Horowitz, 19~9, p. 453). Minori1y e thnic 
groups develop " sense of imperilment, which instig11tes coiJective paranoia 
hy exploi.ting tbt: extreme distrust of th e central government in order to 
secure military aid or protection of the mother na£inn's army (see Tri-
gcorgis, 1993, Souter, 1989, Ethnkicy /n World Politics, 1989, Zut1man, 
1987). 
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St.I"c?tcgic Lrunsformntion of Cruuda 
While the Serb!> in the UNPt\ zones, partic:ularly in the so called K.ra-
jinn, hoped that they would leguli;e the new borders changecl by force at 
the Olnference on the Former Yugoslavia or in the UN, whale they be-
lieved that they were able to suppres.-. and prevent any atlcmpt :.~t the 
reinll!&rrat ion into the Croatian constitutional system, they refused to sit at 
the negotiating tablt: except in the cases when the negotiation served to 
promote their secessionist policicl>. As Zartman says, une e thnic group 
dues not change its tr.ttegy while there is still some hope of succ~·s. 
while circum. umccs are propitiou ancl while they have enough strength to 
ca rry out what they have planned (Zartman, 1987, p. 5 16). 
The military and the politicnl defeat of the Serbian secessionists in 
western ami central Croatia in May and August of 1995 s1 reogthened the 
-.ccurity of Croatia ancl it' influence in the entire Balkan region including 
the last occupied part of Croatia, Eao;tern Slavonia. The central govern-
ment fortified its defense lines, demonstrated a high level of military effi-
ciency and secured American support ancl a lliance. Bosnian Croats also 
achieved enviable results in cooperation with the Bosuian-Muslim Army. In 
collusion with other factors, this fo rced Bosnian St::rhs to accept the Day-
ton accords. Serbia has been economically, politically and internationally 
crushed aocl isoltued by sanction~. A new war in Bo~nia or Eastern Sla-
vonia would trigger off a new wave of refugees in10 Montenegm and 
Serbia. All this bas oomple te ly altered the position of Eastern Slavonia as 
compared to its pos ition when it wlls only a pa1t of the so ca lled Krajina 
whi~.:h no longer exists. This has brought auout a to ta l blockade and a 
stalemate in the:: realization of the plan/\ of the ~erbian sct.:cssionist minor-
ity in Ea!>lc m $ lavonia. The hnpe in the legaliza tion of the alteration of 
Croatian borders by fo rce and war and the unification v.ith Serbia and 
Momenegro e::vapurated. Zartman says that in e thnic connict the Joss of 
hope in the realization of the <1ims, the stalemall.!l> and the blockade!> of 
political and miliuuy moves is the main re:-~son which rem.lers ethnic 
groups ready for dia logue and compromise (Zartman, 1987). 
NegofJ~?tions between Croatian authorities and local Serbs 
from Eastern Slavo11ia 
1n his report of 25 August 1995, soon after the sobering military de-
fea t of the rebel Serbs in central Croatia, Boutros G ha li, UN Sc<...Tetary 
G eneral, mentions how his envoy Yasu hi Akashi talked with Croatian of-
ficials. Serbiao president Milo5evic and the representative." of local Serbs 
from Erdul (capital of Eastern Slavonia) and that :.~IJ three parties agreed 
on the rc!'umption of the talks llt the multilateral basis (UN R eport, 
1995). On that occasion, the Croa tian am.J the Be lgrade diplomacies 
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cia hecl over Easlern Slavonia. The Cro11tian side did not want to allow 
the issue of the reintegration of Eastern Stavonia to be addressed after 
the global agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina bad been . ignct.l and aJ-
tcr the hlmcti<ms for the mmp Yugoslavia had been lifted. Local Serbian 
authorities from Erdut as well as Milosevic could then postpone and boy-
colt the negotiations aLl infinitum :tnd Croatian diplomacy would be pow-
erless At that time. panicularly a t the beginning of September, special 
1\merican envoy and mediator in tJ1e talks about Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Richard Holhrooke, was preparing the draft of the agreement for the 
meeting of foreign secre taries of Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bosnia and 
Hcncgcwina in Geneva on 8 Seplemher. Croatian diplomttcy, in coopera-
tiOn with Richard Holbrooke, prepared the section of the text about the 
rein tegration of Eastern Slavonia into lhc Cma1ian constilutiunal system. 
The underlying idea W(IS that, on the basis of the Security Council Reso-
lution Y81 which defines the te rritOIY of Eastern Slavonia as part of the 
Republic of Croatia, the prm:ess nf smooth ing o ut the diffe rences and 
pHving the way for the comprehensive normalization of the re lations be-
tween Croatia and Yugoslavia and their mutual recognition shoult.l begin. 
At the meeting of fore ign mini~o.tcrs in Geneva, Yugusl;1v Foreign Minister 
turned clown that proposal saying that the problem of Bosnia and Herze-
govina is the priority and should be addressed firs t anti thut Lhe question 
of Eastern Slavonia umld wait. 
The issue o f Eastern $lavonia was not discussed in Geneva. The mem-
bers o f the international mediating team and foreign mini'>ters of Bosnia. 
Croatia ant.! Yugo. lavia gave a joint statement in which they pointed out 
that the co-chairmen of the Peace Conference were detcm1ined to find a 
solution for Eastern Slavonia within the comprehensive peace accord which 
wa · to be their chief task upon re turnino to Croatia the following week. 
lndeed, Thorvald Stoltenberg. the co-chairman nf the Conference on the 
Former Yugol>lavia ant.! the American ambassador io Croatia Pe ter GaJ-
hraith mshetl to Eastern Slavonia in order to make aJJ the necessary 
preparations for the negotiations with tJ1e government in Z<tgreb. 
Fo r almost (I month, Galbraith and Stoltenberg did their best to find a 
possible commo n ground fo r the negotiations. The !.Lance of Belgrade aod 
the Serbian representativef> frum F.nlnt remained firm; they st ill believed 
Lhcy could achieve the legaliza tion of the secession, while the Croatian 
side demnnded that they agree to the reintcbrralinn of E<~sl.em Slavonia. 
Hrvoje Snrinic, head of the Croatian negotiating team set the deadline for 
30 November, the day when the UN mandate in that region expires and 
pointed out that the Croatian government would not prolong their man-
date unless a satisfactory settlement was reached. T 1y ing to preserve 
maximum neutrality regarding the principal protagonists, as has heen rec-
ommended in the studies on the mediation in negotiations (Stephens. 
1988, p. 53), lhe international negotiators emphasized three principle!\: 
first, borders cannot be changed hy force; second, maximum respect for 
human rights and rights of e thnic groups is demanded, and third, UN 
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forces in that region must provide the means for reconciling these two 
aims. However, il "houltl be said tha t the principal protagonists were per-
fcclly aw-,ue of what Kreisberg (KreisbeJ'g, 19 2) hac.J pointed out: where 
great powers are mediators, they look after and promote their own inter-
ests more than 1 he interests of the prot<~gonists in tlle connicL Bcsirle , it 
i'> not unimportant whether tbe great pnwcrs t.:<in recompense the relative 
loss of one s ide in the negotia ting process. 1\Jso, they can arm-twisl the 
c(mnicting parties towards a comprom ise through lhc "ca rrot and stick" 
policy. 
Buuonholcc.J hy the mentioned factors and events, the Serb" from 
&tstern Slavonia held talks witb the Croatian negotiating team on 3 Oc-
tober and, with the rnctliation of Peter GaJbraith and Thorva ld Stolten-
berg, they accepted "The ll<tsic Principles of the A!:,rrccment on Eastern 
Slavooia". The agreement stipulate.' that the tempor.uy government bt: 
banded over to UlC U administration, that the region be demilitarized, 
human rights pr01ected and the r~fugees able to return to their homes. 
At the end of the UN admini.:.tmt1un, free loc3l elections will be held. 
Very . oon a que ·tion arose as to when these bal>ic principles were to 
he transformed into a concrete agn.:cmeonl. T hat ''' I he Basic Principles ... " 
were sho rt-lived anc.J accepted in bad faith became obvious when 1 he ar· 
rnngcu meeting in Zagreb and Osijek did not Lake place. The one in Za-
greb was canceled due to the fa lling nu l. over the venue of the meeting 
while Serbian repn;senlative did not show up for the tnccling in Os.ijek. 
AI that tim e (on 20 October), C hris Guness, UN spokesman in Za-
greb, said that the siLUatinn in E<1stem Secior is extremely tense, lhrtt the 
local Serhs were expecting a Croatian attack, that they were fortifying 
their defense lines a long the entire operational zone of the R ussian U 
battalion in that :.cclm. D espite the apprehension uf local Serbs, he 
atlded, fnr the time being no movemeuLS of Croutian army in the direc-
tion of Eastern Slavonia bad hccn llb 'e rved. 
ln early Novemhcr the talks among presidems of Cmatia, Serbia, and 
Bnl-nia and Herzegovina about Bosnia a nd Hern::govina commenced, with 
the panicipation of intemalinnal, mostly American mediators. A" had been 
expected, Lhe "latus of Eastern Slavonia was immediate ly put on the 
ag~nda . In Dayton, a draft of tbt: agreement between the Croatian gov-
ernment and the loca l Serhs fTom E rdut was written. The Serb:- had to 
come clea11 aftt;r 4 November. The pape.r was based o n the agreement of 
the Croatian and the Yugoslav de h;galion. The premise of the accord was 
spe lled out by Nk:hola.s Burns, State D epartment's spokesman. I le said 
that the basis o f the draft was tbe nonnali7.ation of the re lations between 
Croatia and Yugoslavia which includes mutual recognition. 
Serbian representatives rurned down the linst draft of the Dayton ac-
cord and puM1cd their counter-proposal with Ll points. Milan Mila novic 
a'\ked for a three-year transitio nal administration a o; opposed to one year 
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in the Dayton paper. He also sa1d that the Serbian side insisted on a 
referendum on which Lhe present population would decide on tbe fate of 
~"tern Sl<tvonia The international mediators, and especially American.,, 
saw in this a sign of intransigence and inflcxihility. After several days, 
probably once again under Milo~evic's pressure a new round of draft 
preparation began. Pirst Th01vald Stoltenberg, and then Peter Galbraith 
came up with a new version of the draft. The Serbs were thus cornered 
and hacJ no ~.:hanr.;e of being saved through someone' s good offices. After 
the accord was forced down their throaL'i, lrwal Scrhian representatives 
from Eastem Slavonia si!:,rncd in Erdut on l2 November the document 
cn titled "Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavnnia, BaranjH, 
and Western Slavonin" (Ministry t~f Foreign Affair of the Republic of 
Croatia, 1995). In the aftem9on of the same day. " Basic Agreement'' was 
signed in Zagreb by llrvoje Sarinic. 
Fo r the Serbs any option nf c>.tricating themsetves from the stalemate 
or the blockade would suffice to reject the basic agreement between Za-
greb and Erdut. If the accord about the normalization of the relations 
were not igncd in Pari._, this would represent an opportunity to under-
mine the impleme ntation of the accord. 
Thus Zartman's theory wa..., corroborated: a stalemate or a blockade is 
deci. ivc fnr the negotiations aimed at solving profoulll.l and implacable 
conflicts. The document states that the lm!<tJ Serbian leaders would hand 
over the governn~t.:nt tn the transitional UN administration whose task is 
to demilitarize the region, ensure the protection of people and human 
rights, enable the re turn of tht:: rcfug~.:cs and organize local elections at 
the end of their mamJate. 
Tn the future, the overaU solution of the relation~ between the central 
government in Zagreb and the Serbian minority in Eastern Slavonja is to 
be only a part uf the general normaLization of the relatiollS between 7..a-
!,'Tcb and Belgrade which includes their muwal recognition. This is in line 
with the stance of the internat ional community not to tolerate and rccog-
nizt: any lxmler changes by force and that the procc!>.<. uf the oisintegra-
tiun of a state should be distingui hcu from ·ecession. Cases of the 
breakup of vast empires have been known throughout the history (fur ex-
ample, Rm; iun, Austrian, Ottoman, Brjtish and Spanish empires). This 
<~lso happened to the former Yugoslav federation. The breakup might 
have been a democratic process had there not been the bitter a nd merci-
less will to create on the territory of the former stHte, by means of vio-
lence and the minodties, a new and hig Serbian state that would surpass 
the power ancJ prestige of the former Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union went 
through the same process much more peacefully, thanks to the people 
like Gorbacbev and Ycltsin, who knew that the period of dictator ·hips 
and violence had come to an end. 
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